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OUR CONSTITUTION'S DESIGN: THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR ITS
INTERPRETATION
ATTORNEY GENERAL EDWIN MEESE III*
For most of our history, constitutional adjudication was a
matter of construing the text. Some - like Thomas Jefferson
and Spencer Roane - preferred a strict construction of the
text; others - like John Marshall and Alexander Hamilton -
were given to a loose construction. But whether the approach
was strict or loose, it remained constructionist or interpretivist
- that is, it was assumed that the Constitution possessed a
discernible meaning intended and understood by those who
framed, proposed and ratified its various parts.
Recent decades, however, have witnessed the rise of a radi-
cally different approach. Accordingly, constitutional adjudi-
cation for some today is not primarily a matter of
construction at all, whether loose or strict. Some appear to
view the Constitution as a document virtually without legally
significant discernible meaning. Rather, the Constitution is
seen as a text whose meaning must be created by judges sup-
posedly sensitive to changing social conditions and intoxicated
by only the most recent moral or political philosophies. Such
constitutional analysis depends upon statements like these:
"the well-being of our society,"' "deeply embedded cultural
values,"2 "moral evolution,"' 3 evolving concepts of "human
dignity," 4 "the living development of constitutional justice,"5
* Attorney General of the United States. This article is adapted from a speech
given to the Federalist Society in Washington, D.C., on January 30, 1987.
1. Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV.
204, 226 (1980).
2. G. WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 160 (1978).
3. Perry, Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases: A Functional Justifica-
tion, 56 N.Y.U.L. REv. 278, 291, 307 (1981).
4. Address by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United
States: Contemporary Ratification, delivered to the Text and Teaching Symposium,
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., at 9 (October 12, 1985), reprinted in Ad-
dresses - Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 2 (1985).
5. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW iii (1978).
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"welfare rights,"'6 "the national will," 7 "the principle of equal
citizenship,"8 or "the settled weight of responsible opinion."9
These extra-constitutional values are given as the basis for
determining constitutional meaning. For obvious reasons,
"non-interpretivism" is the name given to this approach. Per-
haps it should be called inventionism because it stands in such
sharp contrast to the traditional methods of legal
construction.
For the most part, the contemporary universe of constitu-
tional adjudication is made up of those who advocate non-
interpretivism and those who argue for interpretivism. As
many of you know from your own experience, non-interpre-
tivists predominate in many law schools today. Soon after his
elevation to the bench, Judge Robert Bork of the United
States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, re-
marked that among law faculty members, President Ronald
Reagan is regarded as one of the great reformers of legal edu-
cation because he has removed most of the few interpretivists
from our law schools by appointing them to the bench.
The Constitution must be understood as something more
than just a lawyer's document. Interpretivism and non-inter-
pretivism are words lawyers may use; they show where the
lines of debate lie on this issue of how judges should decide
cases involving constitutional questions. But what is ulti-
mately at stake in this debate is far more than constitutional
adjudication, although that, to be sure, is very important.
What is at stake, most fundamentally, is the nature of the
Constitution itself, and in turn the nature of our political
order.
Interpretivism assumes that the Constitution is a docu-
ment of fixed and legally binding meaning. Non-interpretiv-
ism assumes that the Constitution is a document that merely
provides a starting point for philosophical adventurism. The
6. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls'
Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962, 966 (1973).
7. Alfange, The Political Mission of the Supreme Court, N. Y. Times, June 1, 1980,
at E20, col. 6 (letter to the Editor).
8. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1977).
9. Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestion for the Revival of Substantive Due Pro-
cess, 1975 Sup. Cr. REV. 261, 279.
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choice between these views has a tremendous impact on the
nature of our political process.
Certainly, history and tradition point to an understanding
of the Constitution as a document of fixed meaning, supplied
by those who framed and ratified it. Apart from the charter's
own terms, there is no better source for the traditional under-
standing of the Constitution than James Madison, who wrote:
"If the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and rati-
fied by the nation.., be not the guide in expounding it, there
can be no security for a stable (government) more than for a
faithful exercise of its power."10 Years later President Martin
Van Buren, in his Inaugural Address, reiterated this under-
standing of the Constitution. He said: "The principle that
will govern me in the high duty to which my country calls me
is a strict adherence to the letter and spirit of the Constitution
as it was designed by those who framed it.""1 It is only in
recent decades that the Constitution has come to be viewed by
some judges and scholars as a document of ever-changing
meaning to be defined, for the moment, by contemporary con-
cepts. One political science textbook, published in 1974, ad-
vises that the Constitution "boils down to how you feel about
politics in your heart."12 One of the leading constitutional law
texts makes a similar, if not more abstruse point. That book
says that "the Constitution is an intentionally incomplete,
often deliberately indeterminate structure for the par-
ticipatory evolution of political ideals and governmental
practices."1 3
Of course the Constitution does not resolve every or even
most political issues of the day - of our own day no more
than that of any other day. It was not intended to. But it was
intended, and indeed it does, establish explicit rules as to how
the great issues of every age are to be decided. This confi-
dence in structure lay at the heart of Madison's and his fellow
Founders' theory of limited popular government.
10. IX THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 191 (G. Hunt ed. 1910).
11. Inaugural Address of President Martin Van Buren, March 4, 1837, reprinted in
MARTIN VAN BUREN 1782-1862, at 23, 29 (I. Sloan ed. 1969).
12. J. TUCKER, THE EXPERIENCE OF POLITICS: YOU AND AMERICAN GOVERN-
MENT 83 (1974).
13. L. TRIBE, supra note 5.
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This is not to suggest that the Founding Fathers envi-
sioned a static society. Certainly they did not. But those
same Founders provided, within the Constitution, the ground
rules for both adaptation and change of our basic governmen-
tal principles and institutions.
In the modem debate over constitutional interpretation,
two issues merit close attention. The first concerns the pur-
poses of a written constitution and what the nature of those
purposes suggest for the task of constitutional interpretation.
The second concerns how our constitutional scheme is en-
forced, both by the courts and by the two so-called political
branches. Exploring these issues can enhance understanding
of our system of constitutional, democratic government and,
more specifically, why courts engaged in judicial review must
be careful to guide their work by the original intention of vari-
ous specific constitutional provisions.
Clearly, one major purpose of a written constitution is to
"constitute" or give structure to a system of government by
establishing, describing and fixing its institutions and compo-
nent parts. The American Constitution accomplished this
purpose with great economy of wording in the original docu-
ment of 1787. That document set up the three branches of the
federal government and granted them each a particular sphere
of political authority.
A second purpose of a written constitution, beyond or-
ganizing the institutions of government, is the limitation and
enumeration of governmental powers. The fundamental
chapters of democratic government, including such docu-
ments as the Magna Carta and the Mayflower Compact, pro-
ceed on the assumption that it is desirable to describe clearly
those things which the government can and cannot do. As
President Reagan pointed out in his 1987 State of the Union
Address, the American Constitution takes this process one
step further conceptually by building in the assumption that
the federal government can exercise only those powers which
are enumerated while all other powers are reserved to the
states, or to the people. 14 Constitutions prior to 1787, in con-
trast, generally assumed that governments were omnipotent
14. Address by President Ronald Reagan, 1987 State of the Union, reprinted in
Vital Speeches 258 (Feb. 15, 1987).
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and could do anything not expressly forbidden by a bill of
rights.
A third purpose of a written constitution is to confer dem-
ocratic legitimacy by formally expressing the consent of the
people to the government's exercise of its authority. Thus, in
a democracy or a republic (as opposed to a constitutional
monarchy or oligarchy), the constitution becomes a social
contract by which the people agree to be bound by laws which
are made pursuant to and in accord with the constitution's
commands. In such a system, the constitution may become -
as it is in the United States - the principal bulwark of the
government's legitimacy.
A fourth purpose of a written constitution is to prevent the
passing fads and passions in the body politic from overriding
fundamental values and principles. Bills of rights in constitu-
tions typically perform this function of preserving basic civil
rights which might otherwise give way before the passions of
the moment. In this fashion, a bill of rights can help preserve
a balance between the need for order and the desire for
freedom.
Our Constitution's unparalleled historical success is the
result, in part, of at least two innovations in the theory of con-
stitutional design that were perfected during the 18th century
by our Founding Fathers, and which allow our Constitution
to better accomplish its four aims. The first of these innova-
tions was the fact of a written constitution. Prior to the
American experience, written constitutions were a rarity. In-
deed, the great model of constitutionalism up to that time had
been Great Britain, whose unwritten constitution was seen as
a shining example of how to impose limits on government pri-
marily through reliance on custom and tradition. Partially in
response to their own experience in regard to the lack of relia-
bility of uncodified English guarantees of rights, our Founding
Fathers chose to rely on a written document with a definite
amendment process.
The Framers thought that only such a written constitution
with a fixed meaning could be relied on to limit the arbitrary
exercise of governmental power. In addition, the Framers em-
braced the idea of having a written social contract as their
charter of government. Such a contract could embody the
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popular, democratic consent which the Framers believed was
essential to legitimize a system of government.
The Framers also employed a second innovation in consti-
tutional design, an innovation which has proven crucial to the
relative success of the American Constitution. That was the
deliberate division of power through checks and balances so
that, as James Madison said, "[a]mbition must be made to
counteract ambition."15 Our Constitution divides authority
through separation of powers between the independent
branches of government, through bicameralism, and through
federalism. When properly functioning, this pluralistic divi-
sion of power should preserve freedom by preventing any one
institution from accumulating so much authority that it can
unilaterally threaten fundamental rights. Accordingly, the
Framer's decision to divide power, as with their decision to
adopt a written constitution, furthers the goals of constitu-
tional liberty by effectively delimiting authority and by mak-
ing it harder for passions of the moment to prevail over the
preservation of fundamental rights.
Here we arrive at the issue of how the document itself
would be enforced. A popular misconception is that the Con-
stitution was designed to be enforced exclusively by the courts.
Under this view, the courts exist primarily to rule on constitu-
tional issues and to act as the impartial umpires of the whole
governmental system. This view, however, overlooks the im-
portance of the self-executing structural features of our Con-
stitution. Each of the three branches of the federal
government and all of the individual state governments help
play an equally important, although often unrecognized, role
in the enforcement of constitutional provisions.
The judiciary, of course, does play a critically valuable role
in enforcing constitutional rights. Often, a judge resolving a
case or controversy may well find an obligation under the ju-
dicial oath of office to strike down an executive or legislative
action. When this is done properly, federal judges breathe life
into constitutional guarantees of limited government. They
vindicate the balance between order and freedom that was
struck when the populace granted its consent to a constitu-
tional system of government.
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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A judge acts properly in declaring an executive or legisla-
tive act unconstitutional when he or she looks at the relevant
written constitutional provision and enforces it according to
its plain words as originally understood. Thus, the judge
properly treats the Constitution as the supreme law and en-
forces the will of the enduring and fundamental democratic
majority that ratified the constitutional provision at issue. In
addition, the judge helps to preserve limited government by
giving practical content and meaning to otherwise nebulous
constitutional guarantees, thereby promoting the purposes of
constitutionalism and validating the consent of the governed.
A problem arises, however, when the courts do not feel
bound by the original intention of a constitutional provision.
In such instances courts may sometimes be tempted to add or
subtract from the written Constitution. In doing this, judges
occasionally justify what they have done by acting as though
we have some extra-constitutional tradition where doctrine
and meaning have no fixed written source and hence, can be
easily changed over time by judicial fiat.
Of course nothing could be further from the truth. The
Framers would have seen no point in writing down constitu-
tional provisions if the courts did not then interpret those
written provisions in the same manner as they would interpret
any other written legal document, such as a statute, a con-
tract, or a will. Our written Constitution cannot bind or limit
discretion or governmental power if it is not interpreted on the
basis of an enduring standard. Thus, non-interpretivism is not
only contrary to common sense, it is also antithetical to the
very notion and purposes of constitutionalism.
It is interesting to note that non-interpretivism is often
viewed exclusively as a means of adding new rights to the
Constitution. Those who look at it in that way forget too eas-
ily that activist judges can also take rights away. Just such a
thing has happened in recent years, where courts have some-
times down-played and overlooked the principle of enumer-
ated powers and other important provisions of the
Constitution, such as the takings and the contracts clauses,
which guarantee certain economic rights.
Our courts should and will continue to play a major role in
enforcing and preserving constitutional rights. But the judici-
ary is not the only branch that preserves constitutional rights
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and promotes the purposes of constitutionalism. The proper
conduct of impeachments, the workings of the amendment
process, and various decisions with respect to war and foreign
policy are all examples that come to mind. Branches other
than the judiciary must enforce the Constitution in these ar-
eas. Thus, all three branches of government have an equal
responsibility to uphold and support the Constitution as they
apply it in the performance of their duties.
The executive branch must be vigilant to assess constitu-
tional issues carefully in making decisions to sign or veto legis-
lation, in drafting presidential signing statements or veto
messages, in employing prosecutorial discretion, in issuing
pardons, and in deciding whether it can in good faith defend
various governmental actions in court. Congress, for its part,
needs to be more attentive to constitutional issues as it consid-
ers legislation and as it conducts hearings and investigations.
In particular, it needs to respect executive prerogatives in re-
gards to the conduct of foreign policy, the appointment of
public officials, and those other areas of governmental author-
ity assigned to the President and his subordinates.
It is the job of the majoritarian branches to make sure,
when possible, that constitutional problems are addressed
before they end up in court. Such attention will help better
fulfill the Constitution's purpose of setting limits on govern-
mental authority, of checking the majoritarian passions of the
moment, and of lending democratic consent and legitimacy to
the government's constant efforts to balance the claims of or-
der and freedom.
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